We analyse how German tourists react to unanticipated shocks that alter their risk perception of selected tourism destinations. Using a difference-in-difference strategy which flexibly accounts for macroeconomic conditions and also addresses potential problems of serial correlation, we isolate significant effects of the 9/11 (2001) terrorist attacks, as well as for the attacks in Egypt (1997), Tunisia (2002), Morocco (2003) and Indonesia (2003). These terror attacks impacted especially on Islamic countries all over the world, indicating a transmission mechanism driven by ethnic and religious proximity. At the same time, tourism into Islamic countries was temporarily substituted by tourism to (south) European countries.
Introduction
Tourism is among the world's biggest industry (Eilat/Einav 2004) . The annual growth rates of the number of international tourists averaged about 4.6% between 1975 and 2000, which roughly corresponds to 1.3 times the growth in global gross domestic product (World Tourism Organization 2007 .
At the same time the tourism industry is susceptible to shocks, such as terror attacks or the incidence of infectious disease , which shape the risk perception of the destination countries. Against the background of the attacks on 11 September (9/11), where some 3,000 people died (Enders/Sandler 2006) , opening up a new dimension in terrorism, as well as a series of other terror attacks between 2001 and 2003, studies of the effects on the tourism industry are, indeed, warranted.
1
Even before the 9/11 attacks there had been studies on the effects of exogenous shocks on touristic demand. For example, Brady and Widdows (1988) extrapolated the number of flight passengers from the US to Europe in the summer of 1986 on the basis of a time series from 1973 to 1985. By comparing actual numbers, they deduced a sharp tumble of up to 70% (for Greece) due to terror attacks and the reactor meltdown in Chernobyl. To estimate the effects of terrorism on tourism, intervention models have been used predominantly since the 1990s, which are based on Auto-Regressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) methods. Alternatively, for example, classical regression models (Witt/Witt 1995) , exponential smoothing (Saunders et al. 1987) or meta-analyses (Crouch 1992 ) are used. Enders et al. (1992) present a theoretical model where consumers engage in a two-stage budgeting decision. Optimising their choice on trips to country (group) 1, country (group) 2, and all other goods, terrorist activities in a country (group) will increase perceived risk of consumers associated with trips to these countries. Also empirically, they identified substitution effects in the tourism behaviour of tourists with shifts away from countries suffering from terror attacks. Similar effects were isolated later on by Vester (2001) , who was also the first to demonstrate regional spillover effects. Pizam and Fleischer (2002) stress that significant effects of terrorism on tourism usually occur with a bit of a time delay within three to nine months following an attack and vary in length of time. This is contrasted by the conclusion drawn by Coshall (2003) , who found that the effect on the number of flight passengers from the US to Europe is immediate, following an attack, and lasts only three to four months. From the mid-1990s there have also been more studies into the effects in other geographic regions, besides those regarding the tourist demand in Europe and the US, with most of the studies dealing with the conflict between Israel and Palestinians (Fleischer/Buccola 2002; Mansfeld 1999; Pizam/Fleischer 2002) . Pizam and Fleischer (2002) found that certain countries recover relatively quickly from terror attacks if they are not followed by additional attacks. Repeated terror attacks, however, can result in a lasting decline in tourist demand or wipe it out entirely. The relevance of attack intensity for effects on demand has been confirmed by Drakos and Kutan (2003) . Apart from studies of an economic and econometric nature, there are also ones that examine terror attacks on the basis of literature research and interviews (Pizam 1999) . Bonham et al. (2006) and Edmonds and Mak (2006) demonstrate that, following the 9/11 attacks, the total worldwide international tourist arrivals decreased in the same year, 2001, only by less than one percent compared to 2000. In 2002 they had already moved up again above 2000 levels. At the same time, though, some countries, such as the US, experience some extreme effects on tourist demand (Ready/Dobie 2003; Lee et al. 2005; Rupp et al. 2005) . Bonham et al. (2006) have found that, on the basis of growth trends before and after 9/11, a recovery effect is not to be expected in the near future. Edmonds and Mak (2006) arrive at heterogeneous post-9/11 effects also for the Asian-Pacific region. While certain countries can recover quickly -also due to simplified entry requirements (for example Singapore) -others suffer a sustained decline in tourist numbers (for example Malaysia) as a result of follow-up attacks, the infectious disease SARS and the uncertain geopolitical situation. Similarly, countries like Morocco and Tunisia took longer to recover from the 9/11 attack than other Islamic countries, because these two countries suffered additional attacks in 2002 and 2003, respectively. What is more, their tourism industries are geared to Western, especially European markets, which is why they were particularly hit by the substitution effect of European tourists choosing to stay away from Islamic destination countries, while there was no compensation from an increase in tourists from other Islamic countries (Al Hamarneh 2004) . Anecdotic evidence indicates that Islamic countries are especially impacted by substitution effects that are caused by changes in risk perception (Leibritz 2004) .
The number of studies examining the effects of terror attacks on tourist demand on the basis of panel data is relatively small. The paper by Garin-Munoz and Amaral (2000) was published before the 9/11 attacks and examines the determinants of tourist demand in Spain, identifying a negative effect stemming from the Gulf War. Sequira and Nunes (2008) and Eilat and Einav (2004) have determined that a higher security risk produces significantly lower numbers of tourists.
The present work supplements previous publications in a number of respects. First, it studies a range of exogenous shocks on tourism that are of distinct magnitude. Besides regional effects of 9/11, it also looks at relatively minor terror attacks before and after the 9/11 attacks. It is also the first study which explicitly tests substitution and adaptation effects in the wake of terror attacks with regard to geographic as well as religious proximity while also taking into account substitution from long-distance to short-distance trips and distinguishing between long term and short term effects. In addition, it is the first multivariate work to study shock-based changes in the tourism demand of a regionally limited group (German tourists, who are among the largest tourist groups in the world). We study how those changes affect all the countries for which sufficient data were available -instead of examining for a selected number of target regions the changes brought on by the tourism behaviour of tourists originating in various possible source regions. This is interesting, because this approach allows for an explicit study of the substitution behaviour of consumers. It is also the first work which uses the Difference-in-DifferenceApproach (DiD) in order to separate the effects of terrorism on tourism demand from unobserved macroeconomic shocks.
It has been shown that a decline in tourist numbers occurs not only as a consequence of terror attacks, particularly those of 9/11, in the countries affected as well as neighbouring countries, but also has global effects in countries with a predominantly Islamic population. A heightened risk expectation is, thus, transferred not only through geographic but also ethnic and religious proximity. Throughout the paper, our analysis concentrates on isolating relative effects on tourist demand from which adjustments in risk perception can be inferred while absolute changes in tourist demand and the respective determinants are not within the narrow focus of this study. Section 2 elaborates on data and methods, section 3 presents results, and section 4 concludes.
Data and empirical strategy
The empirical study is based on annual data on arrivals of German tourists in selected target countries between 1993 and 2005, which have been obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2007) .
2 German Tourists in our data base are defined as persons who live permanently in Germany (irrespective of their nationality) and leave Germany for no longer as 12 months, but stay at least one night abroad. It includes individuals travelling for business reasons as well as to visit relatives etc. In total, the data cover 192 countries. By using growth rates, it was possible to account for the heterogeneity of the countries represented in the sample, while largely ruling out distortions due to different collection methods in determining the number of tourists. However, some countries, for example Turkey or Zimbabwe, changed the method of calculating tourist numbers in the period under review, which is why they have been excluded. 45 countries that were visited by fewer than 1,000 German tourists in at least one year were excluded from the study due to high volatility in the tourism volume and limited informative value regarding overall trends. The data for one or several years are missing for 72 countries. Because one missing raw level data point in general implies two missing growth rate observations they were excluded from the panel study as well. After filtering countries in this manner, a total of 82 countries remained for the purposes of the study. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics. Average statistics do not highlight that Islamic countries have been hit more severely by any post 9/11 tourism crisis. By contrast, median values demonstrate that the growth of incoming tourism for Islamic countries had been higher than in non-Islamic countries before 9/11. After 9/11, this relationship had been reversed. Median growth rates had been especially negative for Islamic countries in 2002 and 2003. In the context of the study, the differentiation between Islamic and non-Islamic countries in regard to the effects of terror attacks on tourism volume depends on whether a country is perceived as an Islamic country by (German) tourists or not. The percentage of the Muslim population (The World Factbook of the CIA 2008) is an obvious measure, while the definition of a threshold value is not that apparent from the start. In order to ensure the robustness of results, all estimates have been done using two treatment groups defined as the percentage of the Muslim population at 50% and 85%, respectively. While results are qualitatively comparable for both specifications throughout our analysis, we present results corresponding to the latter specification since the respective definition ensures a perception as an ''Islamic'' country. Figure 1 shows the countries included in our analysis by proportion of Islamic population as well as the terrorist attacks considered in this analysis.
2 No further information on age brackets or other demographic variables are reported by German Federal Statistical Office (2007) . For data limitations such as limited comparability across countries due to heterogeneous definitions of ''tourist (arrivals)'', diverse methods, sampling and procedures of data collection use the links at www.destatis.de > Publikationen > Qualitätsberichte > Binnenhandel, Gastgewerbe, Tourismus > Tourismus > Monatserhebung. 
Figure 1 Share of Islamic population
We use the DiD method, which essentially examines whether the development in certain countries (treatment group) before and after the event studied (treatment) is different from the control group, which represents a general macro-economic development. Demand in tourism is relatively strongly determined by economic cycles, seasons and trends, as well as susceptible to macroeconomic shocks, such as a rise in oil prices, which increases the cost of flying. The counterfactual provided by the control group should account for these macroeconomic conditions. Via the control group, a general effect of the 9/11 attacks on the propensity to travel will be absorbed. Previous research has shown, however, that the general effect on tourist arrivals was marginal, at least on a world-wide scale (Bonham et al. 2006; . More critically, we expect that a regionally differentiated impact of a globally relevant terrorist attack will harm specific countries in particular, but benefit others via substitution effects. We refer to treatment and control groups to allow for an ease of comparability with a growing body of quasi-experimental literature, but we do not claim that the control group necessarily remained completely unaffected by the shock. In fact, our results are indicative of substitution effects away from the countries in the group of treated (towards at least some of those in the comparison group). We argue that the substitution effect does not prevent us from achieving the main purpose of the analysis: uncovering the channels through which the risk perception of countries is altered following terrorism attacks. But the results should and will be interpreted as exactly what they are: conditional differences in growth rates in tourism into groups of selected destination countries relative the other countries in the sample.
The DiD specification employed here, differentiates annual growth in the tourism volume
between groups of countries (treat/control) and periods (before/after):
Tou it is the annual number of German tourist in country i in year t, treat i is a dummy variable denoting the treatment group consisting either of Islamic countries or countries of determined treatment regions. post t denotes the period after the event considered. Similar to and Redding and Sturm (2005) , and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) this approach controls for macro-economic shocks and general trends by means of a full set of yearly fixed effects (d t ) as well as country-specific fixed effects (ϕ i ). Since unobserved effects d t can be taken into account for any point in time in this way, a parametric specification of the general market development is unnecessary. Long-term trends, short-term shocks and cyclical developments can be captured in a flexible manner. The country fixed effects ϕ i capture cross-country heterogeneity in pre-intervention growth trends while ε it is an error term satisfying the usual OLS conditions (Hayashi 2000: ch. 1) . Note that compared to standard DiD approaches a non-interacted treat term is missing due to perfect collinearity with country effects. The estimated coefficientβ i gives the average change in growth rates across the countries in the treated group relative to the average change in growth grates across countries in the control group.
Note that by using growth rates as a dependent variable differences in pre-trends in tourism flows that would violate the classic DiD assumption are differentiated out. Prominent DiD analyses employing alternative specifications include Hotchkiss et al. (2003), Galster et al. (2004) and Eissa and Liebman (1996) .
In order to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects, we, similar to Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2009) , extend specification (2) by an interactive term of the treatment identifier and a vector of yearly dummy variables denoting the first years after the considered terrorist attack (SHORT t ).
where b is a parameter giving the difference in the treatment effect between the period immediately following the attack, and the long-term effect β. In a similar manner we employ an extended specification in order to account for a potential substitution effect from long-distance to short-distance journeys over the course of our study period, possibly owed to changes in preferences, for example due to climate change.
where dist i is the great circle distance between the geographic centroids of Germany and country i and c is a parameter to be estimated that gives the marginal effect on the expected growth rates for a 1.000 km increase in distance.
A common phenomenon in DiD approaches is serial correlation in the error terms, which causes inefficiency of estimated intervention effects. Since the LM test for serial correlation in a fixed effects model (Baltagi 2001) clearly rejects the hypothesis of no serial correlation, we use an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix as recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004) . It seems that mostly countries in Asia and in the Middle East suffered the negative effects of 9/11 on their tourist volumes. From 2004, however, we see significantly positive recovery effects, which go hand in hand with a considerable relative decline in the tourist volume in European, primarily Southern European, countries. These findings confirm the substitution effects in tourism behaviour discussed by, for example, Leibritz (2004 ) or Vester (2001 , and demonstrated by Bonham et al. (2006) , Edmonds and Mak (2006) as well as Enders et al. (1992) . Since the time after 9/11 in the US saw a significant reduction in tourist volume, especially in the Middle East, one must inquire about the underlying transmission mechanism.
Obviously the risk perception of the tourist destination did not just change because of geographic proximity. Instead, the results point to a special decline in Islamic countries, which make up a disproportionate percentage of the Middle East. This special decline has been discussed in the literature, but has not been proved statistically (Al Hamarneh 2004; Leibritz 2004) . In order to examine more closely a potential transmission process behind the risk perception of German tourists, which is driven not geographically but by ethnic-religious factors, in the second step of the study the effects on the tourist flows, particularly into Islamic countries, are examined. We begin with a descriptive evaluation of the tourism trends in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, which we plot (in logs) in Overall, the trends are strongly suggestive of a negative short-run effect that disproportionally hit Islamic destinations and a subsequent recovery. This relative decline, furthermore, cannot be explained by pre-trends. If one believes that the linear extrapolations in Figure 2 provide a reasonable approximation of the counterfactual trends, the DiD estimates based on growth rates presented in the remainder of the paper slightly understate the true effect.
Column (1) of Table 3 summarizes the effects of 9/11 on a treatment group that consists of Islamic countries and is based on the DiD specification (1 Notes: post represents the period from the year following the attack to the end of 2005. short_1_2 represents the two years following the attack, post_1 the year immediately after the attack and short_2 the second year after the attack. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year effects.
(Column (2)). If a further differentiation is made, between the individual years immediately after the attack, a somewhat more marked effect for 2003, compared to 2002, emerges (Column (3)).
Since we cannot reject that there is an ongoing substitution effect from long-distance to short-distance journeys owing to other determinants than perceived risk of tourism destinations, we repeat the estimates using specification (4). If the average Islamic countries were located at a larger distance from Germany compared to the countries of the control group, then the respective substitution effect could have been erroneously attributed to the characteristic ''Islamic''. Indeed, over the course of our study period such a tendency for substituting short-distance for long-distance journeys is observable. For a number of years there is a significantly negative relationship between growth rates in tourist demand and distance to the respective destination, indicating a relative increase in demand for closer locations at the expense of farther destinations. This relationship is particularly significant for the year after 9/11, confirming the results by Enders et al. (1992) . Nevertheless, magnitude and precision of the key coefficients of interest remain almost unaffected by introduction of the geographic control variables, thereby discarding this substitution effect as a potential source of bias.
Robustness checks
To check the robustness of the substitution effect in the tourism behaviour of German tourists, identified in the global sample, away from Islamic to non-Islamic countries, the results of regionally limited country groups are compared, which show similarities in factors important to tourists, such as climate, vegetation and the range of tourist opportunities. The study of the effects of the 9/11 attacks on the growth rates of tourist arrivals in Islamic countries is done in a manner analogous to (Table 4 , columns 1-4) confirm a significant, short-term decline in tourism in Islamic countries following the 9/11 attacks, which are characterized, as far as African Islamic countries are concerned, by an (overcompensating) recovery starting in 2004. The effects are greater in quantity both for Africa and the Mediterranean region than for the global study (Table 3) , which, again, implies specific ethnic-religious effects of terrorism on tourism. The results for Asia show the same quality of pattern as those obtained from the global sample, but they are not statistically significant. In order to compare the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks, which are geographically remote from Islamic countries, with the effects of the following -also islamically motivatedterror attacks, additional terror attacks have been analysed in a further step ( The criteria for selecting attacks include the location of the attack (an Islamic country where data on arrivals of German tourists are available) and, above all, the significance of the attack for tourism. Therefore, attacks have been selected that focused on tourist targets and whose victims were primarily tourists. The attack in Egypt in 1997 is an event that occurred before the 9/11 attacks. It was selected so as to have a framework Notes: post represents the period from the year following the attack to the end of 2005. short_1_2 represents the two years following the attack, post_1 the year immediately after the attack and short_2 the second year after the attack. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year effects.
for comparison with the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks. The Indonesia case allows for insight into the effects on predominantly non-Islamic neighbouring states. This should allow for conclusions about geographic proximity as a determinant in the transmission process of risk perception.
Similar to the 9/11 attacks, for the purposes of analysing the terror attacks in Table 5 , the study looked at the periods after the attacks, with special emphasis on the shortterm effects in the first two years. In the case of Egypt, the year 1998 has been marked as the start of the post period, because the attack occurred towards the end of 1997 (11 November). Column (1), analogous to column 3 in Table 3 , has been controlled for tourism development in Islamic countries (isl) by isolating the years 1998-2000. Columns (2) to (6) are similarly controlled for the effects of 9/11 on Islamic countries. This way the treatment coefficients can be used to test for deviations in tourism development in the treatment countries in relation to the trends encountered in Islamic countries. Results remain qualitatively unchanged if controls for impact on Islamic countries are omitted.
Egypt experienced a considerable decline in tourist volume following the 1998 attack, but saw an almost complete recovery after one year. In the three years 1998, 1999 and 2000 it actually recorded significantly higher growth.
The attack in Tunisia occurred on 11 April 2002, which allowed for the effects on tourist numbers to be tested in the same year. In contrast to Column (1), the findings (2) point to a weaker development (yet only slightly significant) of Tunisia's tourist volume. Over the long term the growth rates were 9.2 percentage points below the reference group; in the short term the year of the attack saw an additional significant effect of minus 19.6 percentage points. While the short-term effect was less pronounced than in the 1998 attack in Egypt, Tunisia did not see its tourist numbers recover over the medium term. The attacks in Morocco occurred on 16 May 2003. As a result, the study looked at the effects from 2003 onwards. A (slightly significant) negative relative long-term effect has been identified on growth rates of a size similar to Tunisia. The short-term effects are not statistically significant. This could be explained by the fact that the attack in Morocco, unlike the attacks in Egypt and Tunisia, did not affect German tourists directly, which is why coverage in the German media was less comprehensive. In addition, there is the possibility of an ''adaptation effect'', which causes tourists to react less sensitively to attacks. Looking at the 2002 attack in Tunisia, the short-term decline in tourist numbers was already less than for the 1997 attack in Egypt.
The two attacks on Bali in Indonesia on 12 October 2002 were the most consequential terror attacks by an Islamic group after 9/11 and resulted in over 200 deaths. Unlike the attacks in Tunisia and Morocco, Indonesia, however, exhibited only a short-term, statistically significant, effect of approx. 13 percentage points (Column 4) in 2003 compared to the reference group of Islamic countries. It should be noted in this context that the Southeastern region of Asia was affected that same year by the infectious disease SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), which also shaped the risk perception of the region. Indonesia itself saw relatively little fallout from SARS. Therefore, the treatment group in Column (5) is expanded to include the Southeast-Asian countries Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in order to test the joint impact of the terror attack and SARS in the region of Southeast Asia (SEA). The region exhibits only a barely significantly but somewhat stronger decline in tourism in 2003 than in Indonesia, which cannot be explained by regional spillover effects of the attack in Indonesia. To test for any significant deviation in the development in Indonesia compared to the region, the specification in Column (4) is expanded in Column (6) to include interactive terms that capture the development in the entire region. While there was significant difference between the development of Indonesia and its neighbouring states in the long term as well as in the first year, 2004 saw the trend go into reverse. Thus the region without Indonesia shows a slightly significant recovery, while the tourist volume in Indonesia drops once again in relative terms, with this negative effect actually exceeding the positive regional effect. It follows therefore that the joint impact of the terror attack and SARS had longer-lasting effects in Indonesia than in its neighbouring states. Assuming that the effects of the terror attack on Bali diminish with distance, a conclusion can be drawn that the terror attack, compared to SARS, has produced a longer-term adjustment of tourists' risk perception. In summary, individual events, such as the terror attack in Egypt in 1997, led to considerable declines in tourist flows in the regions affected over the short term (about a year), but the regions were able to recover relatively quickly. It was not until the combination of the 9/11 attacks and further terror attacks in subsequent years that tourist volumes were reduced in a sustained fashion in the cases reviewed in the study. The findings in Table 4 have been visualized in Figure 3 for Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Indonesia) in relation to other Islamic countries. Figure 3 also depicts the effects of the terror attack 9/11 on Islamic countries compared to non-Islamic countries (9/11) ( Table 3 , column (3)). 2002, 2003 and 2002-2005 are dummy variables describing the corresponding years. Given the short post period, no interactive term for the second year has been applied in the case of Morocco. Isl is dummy denoting countries with a proportion of Islamic population of above 85%. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year effects.
Finally it has to be noted that the east and south-east Asian region was subject to the 2004 tsunami catastrophe. In order to rule out that some of the previous findings for the region were driven by the natural disaster we investigate the effects of this shock on (Table 3 , column (3)), other indices refer to tourism in the respective countries while controlling for 9/11 effect (exception: Egypt, 1998-2000) ( Table 5 ).
Figure 3 Estimated Impact of Terrorism Attacks on Tourism
tourism demand. We found a statistically significant negative effect for the tsunami region relative to the rest of the world, but no significant within region differentials. Details are available in the appendix.
Conclusion
This study, the first to use a DiD approach, examines changes in tourism behaviour fol- (Table 3 , column (3)). This trend was accompanied by temporary substitution effects in favour of (Southern) European states. Moreover, in the course of the period under observation a substitution effect was identified, with tourists opting for trips within closer proximity over long-distance tourism, which was particularly highly significant in the year following 9/11. The findings of the study of the terror attacks in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco confirm, as already discussed by Pizam and Fleischer (2002) regarding the tourism industry of Israel, that the frequency of terror attacks, as well as their intensity, can be decisive for the time during which effects are noticeable. The tourist volume in Egypt after the 1997 attack more than recovered within only two years, while Morocco and Tunisia, which both suffered additional attacks, did not exhibit any indication of a significant recovery after two and three years, respectively. While attacks after 9/11 produced longer-lasting, stronger (negative) effects, a significant attenuation of the effects has been observed in the short term. These results provide initial proof of an adaptation effect, which was described by Blinda and Harms (2006) , but had not been studied empirically yet. While the short-term effects of the 1997 attack in Egypt were very strong, the effects in Tunisia and Morocco in the aftermath of the attacks in 2002 and 2003 were relatively minor. Apparently the attack in Egypt was a surprising and novel intervention, which was followed by an especially strong adjustment in risk perception. An adjustment of such extent is not observed with any of the subsequent attacks.
Regional spillover effects of terror attacks have been examined for the region Southeast Asia on the basis of the Bali terror attacks in 2002. The study has found in its (nonIslamic) neighbouring countries a significantly negative relative trend in tourism volume in 2003. The short-term effects were at least as marked as in Indonesia, which cannot be explained by regional spillover effects, but instead points to an additional impact from the infectious disease SARS, which had devastated particularly the neighbouring countries in 2002. Over the long term, however, Indonesia, when compared to its neighbouring countries, shows stronger effects on tourist volume, which may indicate that terror attacks tend, in relative terms, to produce longer-term adjustments. Future research should extend the analysis by collecting and analysing the data for other countries or even using a world wide basis. In addition if tourists' subjective risk assessment following a terrorist attacks depends -besides economic and geographic considerations -on social, ethnic and religious determinants, then similar mechanisms are likely to apply also to other economic agents, for example, acting at financial markets. For instance, one might expect similar adjustments in the distribution of FDI. More research might lead to a more profound understanding on the transmission of a broader range of local economic shocks, which, with increasing integration, tend to affect more and more regional markets. effect is strong even compared to the joint-impact of the 2002 terrorist attack in Indonesia and SARS, it is unlikely to be entirely attributable to the tsunami catastrophe, given that the decline in tourism also occurred to countries unaffected by the shock. Tourists appear to have either excluded the possibility of a repetition of a similar natural disaster or associated the whole region with a higher risk of being hit.
